In most sectors, technological progress boosts efficiency. But financial technology and the associated data-intensive trading strategies have been blamed for market inefficiency. A key cause for concern is that better technology might induce traders to extract other's information from order flow data mining, rather than produce information themselves. Defenders of these new trading strategies argue that they provide liquidity by identifying uninformed orders and taking the other side of their trades. We adopt the lens of long-run growth to understand how improvements in financial technology shape information choices, trading strategies and market efficiency, as measured by price informativeness and market liquidity. We find that unbiased technological change can explain a market-wide shift in data collection and trading strategies. But our findings also cast doubt on common wisdom. First, although extracting information from order flow does crowd out production of fundamental information, this does not compromise price informativeness. Second, although taking the opposite side of uninformed trades is typically called "providing liquidity," the rise of such trading strategies does not necessarily improve liquidity in the market as a whole. * Princeton University; farboodi@princeton.edu † Department of Economics Stern School of Business, NBER, and CEPR, New York University, 44 W. 4th Street, New York, NY 10012; lveldkam@stern.nyu.edu; http://www.stern.nyu.edu/∼lveldkam.
" [I] ts all about getting as much customer order flow as possible ... The more trades these sophisticated machines get to see, the better they become [at] making money for their creators." (Reuters, August 14, 2009) In most sectors, technological progress boosts efficiency. But in finance, information technology and the new data-intensive trading strategies it has spawned have been blamed for market volatility, illiquidity and inefficiency. One reason financial technology is suspect is that its rise has been accompanied by a shift in the nature of financial analysis and trading. Instead of "kicking the tires" of a firm, investigating its business model or forecasting its profitability, many traders today engage in statistical arbitrage: They search for "dumb money," or mine order flow data and develop algorithms to profit from patterns in others' trades. It appears that technology makes it easier to detect what others know. If so, does financial technology deter information production and reduce market efficiency?
Teasing out the effect of technology with data alone is difficult. Many other concurrent trends may mask the effects. Furthermore, it is not obvious which predictions to test when technological change affects equilibrium prices and behavior of all market participants. Therefore, we build a model to explore whether improvements in data processing naturally favor one type of information processing over another, and what consequences this has for market efficiency.
Our contribution is to sort out what are and what are not logical consequences of long-run information technology growth on financial markets. The model explains why, with poor technology, uncovering fundamental data is more profitable than mining order flow data, even if the technology for doing both activities is equally poor. As information technology improves, the model teaches us that the incentive to mine order flow data grows, and can crowd out fundamental data gathering. Contrary to popular wisdom, this shift in data processing and in trading strategies does not necessarily compromise financial market efficiency. Efficiency, as measured by price informativeness, continues to rise, even if fundamental data gathering falls. Efficiency, as measured by the price impact of an uninformed trade (liquidity), stagnates.
Even though order flow data allows investors to identify uninformed trades, and even though investors use this information to take the opposite side of these trades, market-wide liquidity may not improve.
To explore these forces, our model of the financial economy (in Section 1) requires the following features. First, investors choose between styles of financial analysis, observe the data produced from that analysis, and then invest. Financial analysis here means processing some type of data. One analysis style is fundamental analysis, which involves processing earnings reports, business model simulations, macro announcement data etc., that help to predict the future value of a firm. The other style of analysis is extracting information from the trades (order flow) of others. Modeling the trade-off between analyzing fundamental and order flow data is new and allows us to explore the market inefficiency argument. Second, we incorporate long-lived assets. This feature is essential to understand the long-run balanced growth of fundamental and order flow analysis. Long-lived assets also create the future information risk that compromises market liquidity. Third, the driving force behind the model is technological change in the total flow of data the sector can analyze or process. Of course, other trends, such as a decline in fees, entry of new investors or assets, digitization, changes in covariance or improvements in order flow execution are operating during this period as well. We want to take one simple trend, unbiased technological progress in data processing, and see how much that alone can explain. This simple driving force offers a foundation for exploring financial technology growth, to which many other ingredients and trends might eventually be added. Finally, we also explore biased technological change that only improves the efficiency of order flow analysis. While the dynamic patterns of information choices change, the basic message does not. The surge in order flow mining does not undermine price informativeness, nor does it substantially improve liquidity.
Our theoretical results examine how investors choose to use their growing capacity to process data.
The main mechanism underlying the results is that an increase in total information creates an endogenous change in the relative value of fundamental versus order-flow information (Section 2). When technology is poor, information is scarce, and it is very valuable to know about the fundamental value of an asset.
The alternative strategy of processing data to identify uninformed trades is not valuable when so little of trade is well-informed. When more investors are well-informed, it becomes more valuable to identify and trade against the remaining non-informational trades. Order flow analysis allows investors to target these more profitable trades. In fact, for a range of technology levels, the more order flow analysis and trading is done, the more profitable it is for other investors to pile in with yet more order flow analysis and trading. This complementarity in trading strategies allows order flow trading to not only catch up with trading on fundamental information, but actually to surpass it and crowd out much of the fundamental analysis that was previously done at lower technology levels. And yet, in the long run, as the capacity for data processing becomes large, fundamental analysis cannot disappear. If it did, there would be no information to extract from order flow. Instead, eventually, order flow analysis and fundamental analysis grow together, in proportion to each other.
When we turn to discuss the consequences of this shift in data analysis and trading strategies, it is useful to see time paths. To produce these, we need to put some plausible numbers to the model. Section 3 calibrates the model to financial market data so that we can explore the growth transition path and its consequences for market efficiency numerically.
The results on market efficiency offer two surprises. First, even as order flow analysis crowds out fundamental analysis and reduces the discovery of information about the future asset value, price informativeness continues to rise. The reason is that order flow information allows order flow traders to extract fundamental information from prices. That makes the order flow traders, and thus the average trader, better informed about future asset fundamentals. When the average trader is better informed, prices are more informative. This might lead one to conclude that price informativeness doesn't measure financial efficiency in the way we thought it did. But according to this commonly-used measure, market efficiency continues to improve as technology progresses.
Second, even though order flow traders systematically take the opposite side of uninformed trades, the rise of order flow trading does not enhance market liquidity (Section 4). This is surprising because taking the opposite side of uninformed trades is often referred to as "providing liquidity." This is one of the strongest arguments that proponents of activities such as high-frequency trading use to defend their methods. But if by providing liquidity, we really mean reduce the price impact of uninformed trade, the rise of order flow trading may not accomplish that. The problem is not order flow trading today, but the expectation of informed trading of any kind -fundamental or order flow -tomorrow. The fact that tomorrow's investors will be well-informed gives rise to future information risk. This is the risk posed by information that is unknown today, will be learned tomorrow, and will move tomorrow's price. Because assets are long-lived, tomorrow's price uncertainty is today's payoff risk. So future data processing raises the risk of investing in assets today. More risk per share of asset today is what causes the sale of one share of the asset to have a larger effect on the price.
Thus, the rise in order-flow trading, rise in return uncertainty, and stagnation of liquidity, emerge as concurrent trends with financial technology as their common cause. For asset returns, the net effect of future information risk and less uncertainty about dividends today is a slightly lower risk premium, consistent with empirical equity premia measures.
Finally, Section 5 shows why these trends in market efficiency are relevant for the real economy. This last section sketches two extensions of the model. One argues that, if firm managers are compensated with equity, better price informativeness improves their incentives to exert optimal effort. The second extension shows how the same forces that underlie market liquidity also reduce the cost of equity issuance for a firm that wants to raise capital for real investment. Thus more liquid markets should also promote efficient real investment and long-run economic growth.
Contribution to the existing literature Our model combines features from a few disparate literatures.
Long run trends in finance are featured in Asriyan and Vanasco (2014) , Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) , and Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012) , who model growth in fundamental analysis or an increase in its speed. Davila and Parlatore (2016) explore a decline in trading costs. Philippon (2015) argues that increased issuance can explain the growth of the financial sector. Our assumption that there is long-run growth in information processing is supported by the rise in price informativeness documented by Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013) .
A small, growing literature examines order-flow information in equilibrium models. In Yang and Ganguli (2009) , agents can choose whether or not to purchase a fixed bundle of fundamental and order-flow information. In Yang and Zhu (2016) and Manzano and Vives (2010) , the precision of fundamental and order-flow information is exogenous. Babus and Parlatore (2015) examine intermediaries who observe the order flow of their customers. Our order flow signals also resemble Angeletos and La'O (2014) 's sentiment signals about other firms' production, Banerjee and Green (2015) 's signals about motives for trade, the signaling by He (2009) 's intermediaries, and the noise in government's market interventions in Brunnermeier, Sockin, and Xiong (2017) . But none of these papers examines the choice that is central to this paper: The choice of whether to process more about asset payoffs or to analyze more order flow. Without that trade-off, these papers cannot explore how the incentives to process each type of information change as productivity improves. Furthermore, this paper adds a long-lived asset in a style of model that has traditionally been static. 1 The long-lived asset causes growth in future information processing to have feedback effects on uncertainty and information choices today.
In the microstructure literature, our model contributes a new perspective on what high-frequency traders do, which complements work by Du and Zhu (2017) , Crouzet, Dew-Becker, and Nathanson (2016) and others. Empirically, Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) and Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) use natural experiments to measure how fundamental and algorithmic trading affects liquidity. By contributing theory to this discussion, we can understand why the shift is taking place.
1 Exceptions include 2-and 3-period models, such as Cespa and Vives (2012) .
Model
To explore the dynamic evolution of financial analysis style and its consequences, we incorporate information choice in a dynamic model with long-lived assets and asymmetric information, as in Wang (1993) .
While the long-lived asset assumption is unusual in information choice models, it is crucial for the liquidity and long-run balanced growth results. The choice of fundamental information precision resembles that in repeated static models such as Kacperczyk, Nosal, and Stevens (2015) . But the new aspect of our information choice is that acquiring fundamental information trades off with extracting of information from order flow. Of course, it would be simpler to assume that the mix of information changes exogenously. But that would not inform us about why investment strategies are changing. If we took that approach, we might wrongly attribute the stagnation of market liquidity to an increase in order flow information extraction, instead of understanding both as outcomes of growth in financial technology.
A key question is how to model information extraction from order flow, which, in practice, can take many forms. Extraction might take the form of high-frequency trading, where the information of an imminent trade is used to trade before the new price is realized. It could be mining tweets or Facebook posts to gauge sentiment. Extraction could take the form of "partnering," a practice where brokers sell their order flow to hedge funds, who systematically trade against, what are presumed to be uninformed traders. 2 Finally, it may mean looking at price trends, often referred to as technical analysis, in order to discern what information others may be trading on. All of these practices have in common that they are not uncovering original information about the future payoff of an asset. Instead, they are using information to profit from what others already know (or don't know). We capture this general strategy, while abstracting from many of its details, by allowing investors to observe a signal about the non-informational trades of other traders. This order flow signal allows our traders to profit in three ways. 1) They can identify and then trade against uninformed order flow; 2) they can remove noise from the equilibrium price to uncover more of what others know; or 3) they can exploit the mean-reversion of order flow shocks to buy before price rises and sell before it falls. These three strategies have an equivalent representation in the model and collectively cover many of the ways investors profit from information technology.
Setup
Investor preferences and endowments At the start of each date t, a measure-one continuum of overlapping generations investors is born. Investors born at time t have constant absolute risk aversion utility over total, end of period t consumptionc t :
where ρ is absolute risk aversion.We adopt the convention of using tildes to indicate t-subscripted variables that are not in the agents' information set when they make time-t investment decisions.
Each investor i born at date t is endowed with an exogenous income that isẽ it units of consumption goods. Investors can use their income to buy risky assets at the start of the period. But they cannot trade 2 Market evidence suggests that hedge funds value the opportunity to trade against the uninformed, as noted by Goldstein in a 2009 Reuters article: "Right now, ETrade sends about 40% of its customer trades to Citadels market-maker division . . . Indeed, the deal is so potentially lucrative for Citadel that the hedge fund is willing to make an upfront $100 million cash payment to the financially-strapped online broker."
shares of or any assets contingent on this income.
There is a single tradeable asset. 3 Its supply is one unit per capita. It is a claim to an infinite stream of dividend payments {d t }:d
where µ and G < 1 are known parameters. The innovationỹ t ∼ N (0, τ −1 0 ) is revealed andd t is paid out at the end of each period t.
An investor born at date t, sells his assets at price p t+1 to the t + 1 generation of investors, collects dividendsd t per share, combines that with the endowment that is left (ẽ it − q it p t ), times the rate of time preference r > 1, and consumes all those resources. Thus the cohort-t investor's budget constraint is
where q it is the shares of the risky asset that investor i purchases at time t andd t are the dividends paid out at the start of period t + 1. Since we do not prohibit c t < 0, all pledges to pay income for risky assets are riskless.
The value of endowments is correlated with the dividend:ẽ it =ē + h itỹt +˜ eit , whereē is known and eit ∼ N (0, τ −1 e ) is independent across agents and independent of all the other shocks in the economy. The variable h it governs the correlation of agent i's endowment with output. That variable has a common component and an investor-specific component:
). 4 This rich, correlated endowment process serves simply to avoid noise traders. For information to have value, prices must not perfectly aggregate asset payoff information. As in Manzano and Vives (2010) , we inject noise in prices by giving investors both informational and non-informational -hedging -reasons for trade. Investors have non-financial income risk that they hedge with financial assets. Shocks to this hedging demand is our source of noise in prices. Equivalently,x t could also be interpreted as aggregate demand, sentiment or noise trading. For now, we assume thatx t is independent over time. We discuss the possibility of autocorrelatedx t in Section 2.4.
Information Choice If we want to examine how the nature of financial analysis has changed over time, we need to have at least two types of analysis to choose between. Financial analysis in this model means signal acquisition. Our constraint on acquisition could represent the limited research time for uncovering new information. But it could also represent the time required to process and compute optimal trades based on information that is readily available from public sources.
Investors choose how much information to acquire or process about the next-period dividend innovatioñ y t , and also about the hedgers' demand shocks,x t . We call η f it =ỹ t +˜ f it a fundamental signal and η xit =x t +˜ xit an order-flow signal. What investors are choosing is the precision of these signals. In other words, if the signal errors are distributed˜ f it ∼ N (0, Ω f it ) and˜ xit ∼ N (0,Ω xit ), then the precisions Ω f it andΩ xit are choice variables for investor i. For notational convenience, we define Ω xit = τ h +Ω xit .
Instead of choosingΩ xit ≥ 0, we then allow the investor choose Ω xit ≥ τ h . Then Ω xit represents the joint signal precision that the investor has both from order-flow analysis and from observing his own endowment exposure to systemic financial risk.
The constraint that investors face when choosing information is
This represents the idea that getting more and more precise information about a given variable is tougher and tougher. But acquiring information about a different variable is a separate task, whose shadow cost is additive.
The main force in the model is technological progress in information analysis. Specifically, we assume that K t is a deterministic, increasing process.
Information sets and equilibrium First, we recursively define two information sets. The first is all the variables that are known at the end of period t − 1. This information is
. This is what investors know when they choose what signals to acquire. The second information set is
This includes the two signals the investor chooses to see, information contained in equilibrium prices and the information conveyed by one's endowed income. This is the information set the investor has when they make investment decisions. The time 0 information set includes the entire sequence of information capacity:
t=0 . An equilibrium is a sequence of information choices {Ω f it }, {Ω xit } and portfolio choices {q it } by investors such that 1. Investors choose signal precisions Ω f it and Ω xit to maximize
, where U is defined in (1), taking the choices of other agents as given. 5 This choice is subject to (4), Ω f it ≥ 0
and Ω xit ≥ τ h .
2. Investors choose their risky asset investment q it to maximize E[U (c it )|η f it , η xit , h it , p t ], taking the asset price and the actions of other agents as given, subject to the budget constraint (3).
3. At each date t, the risky asset price clears the market:
Solving the Model
There are four main steps to solve the model.
Step 1: Solve for the optimal portfolios, given information sets. Each investor i at date t chooses a number of shares q it of the risky asset to maximize expected utility (1), subject to the budget constraint (3). The first-order condition of that problem is
Step 2: Clear the asset market. Given this optimal investment choice, we can impose market clearing (5) and obtain a price function that is linear in past dividends d t−1 , the t-period dividend innovationỹ t , and the aggregate component of the hedging shocksx t :
where the coefficients A t , B, C t and D t solve the following set of equations:
where Ω pit is the precision of the information aboutd t , extracted jointly from prices and order flow signals.
is the posterior uncertainty about next-period dividend innovations and the resulting uncertainty about asset returns is proportional to
Step 3: Compute ex-ante expected utility. When choosing information to observe, investors do not know what signal realizations will be, nor do they know what the equilibrium price will be. The relevant information set for this information choice is I + t−1 . After we substitute the optimal portfolio choice (6) and the equilibrium price rule (7) into utility (1), and take log and then the beginning of time-t expectation (−E[ln(E[exp(ρc it 
, we get an time-1 expected utility expression that is similar to most CARA-normal models:
. Appendix A shows that the agent's choice variables Ω f it and Ω xit show up only through the conditional precision of payoffs, V ar[p t+1 +d t |I it ] −1 . The reason for this is that the first-moment terms in asset demand -E[p t+1 +d t |I it ] and p -have ex-ante expected values that do not depend on the precision of any given investor's information choices. In other words, choosing to get more data of either type does not, by itself, lead one to believe that payoffs or prices will be particularly high or low. So, information choices amount to minimizing the payoff variance V ar[p t+1 +d t |I it ], subject to the data constraint. The payoff variance, in turn, has a bunch of terms the investor takes as given, plus a term that depends on dividend variance, V ar[ỹ t |I it ]. Equation (12) shows that V ar[ỹ t |I it ] depends on the sum of fundamental precision Ω f it and price information Ω pit . Price information precision is Ω pit = (C t /D t ) 2 (τ x + Ω xit + τ h ), which is linear in Ω xit . Thus expected utility is a function of the sum of Ω f it and
Thus, optimal information choices maximize the weighted sum of fundamental and order-flow precisions:
s.t. (4), Ω f it ≥ 0, and Ω xit ≥ τ h .
Step 4: Solve for information choices. The first order conditions yield
This solution implies that information choices as symmetric. Therefore, in what follows, we drop the i subscript to denote an agent's data processing choice.
The information choices are a function of pricing coefficients, like C and D, which are in turn functions of information choices. To determine the evolution of analysis and its effect on asset markets, we need to compute a fixed point to a highly non-linear set of equations. After substituting in the first order conditions
for Ω f t and Ω xt , we can write the problem as two non-linear equations in two unknowns.
Interpreting Order Flow Trading
Why are order flow signals useful? They don't predict future dividends or future prices. They only provide information about current demand. The reason that information is valuable is that it tells the investor something about the difference between price and expected asset value. One can see this by looking at the signal extracted from prices. Price is a noisy signal about dividends. To extract the price signal, we subtract the expected value of all the terms besides the dividend, and divide by the dividend coefficient C t . The resulting signal extracted from prices is
Notice how order flow shocksx t are the noise in the price signal. So information about this order flow reduce noises in the price signal. In this way, the order flow signal can be used to better extract others' dividend information from the price. This is the sense in which order flow analysis is information extraction.
Of course, real order flow traders are not taking their orders, and then inverting an equilibrium pricing model to infer future dividends. But another way to interpret the order flow trading strategy is that it is identifying non-information trades to trade against. In equation (16) If we interpret order flow trading as finding dumb money, it is easy to see why it becomes more valuable over time. If there is very little information, everyone is "dumb," and finding dumb money is pointless.
But when informed traders become sufficiently informed, distinguishing dumb from smart money, before taking the other side of a trade, becomes essential.
Measuring Financial Market Efficiency
To study the effects of financial technology on market efficiency, we assess efficiency in two ways. One measure of efficiency is price informativeness. The asset price is informative about the unknown future dividend innovationỹ t . The coefficient C t on the dividend innovationỹ t in the equilibrium price equation (7) measures price informativeness. C t governs the extent to which price reacts to a dividend innovation.
It corresponds to the price informativeness measure of Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013 tomorrow. Since prices are linked to current dividends, this also predicts a high asset price tomorrow and thus a high return. Knowing this allows the investor to buy more of the asset in times when its return will be high and less when return is likely to be low.
In contrast, order flow information is not directly relevant to future payoff or future price. But one can still profit from trading on order flow. An investor who knows that hedging demands are high will systematically profit by selling the asset because high hedging demands will make the price higher than the fundamental value, on average. In other words, order flow signals allow one to trade against dumb money
The next result proves that if the price has very little information embedded in it, because information is scarce (K t is low), then getting order flow data to extract price information is not very valuable. In other words, if all trades are "dumb," then identifying the uninformed trades has no value.
Result 1 When information is scarce, order flow analysis has zero marginal value:
As K t → 0, for any future path of prices (A t+j , B t+j , C t+j and
The proof (in Appendix B) establishes two key claims: 1) that when K ≈ 0, there is no information in the price: C t = 0 and 2) that the marginal rate of substitution of order flow information for fundamental information is proportional to (C t /D t ) 2 . Thus, when the price contains no information about future dividends (C t = 0), then analyzing order flow is has no marginal value (C t /D t ) 2 = 0. Order flow information is only valuable in conjunction with the current price p t because it allows one to extract more information from price. Order flow trading when K t = 0 is like removing noise from a signal that has no information content.
This results explains why analysts focus on fundamentals when financial analysis productivity is low.
In contrast, when prices are highly informative, order flow information is like gold because it allows one to identify exactly the price fluctuations that are not informative and are therefore profitable to trade on. The next results explain why order flow analysis increases with productivity growth and why it may eventually start to crowd out fundamental analysis.
As financial technology grows, order flow analysis takes off. The concern with the deleterious effects of financial technology on market efficiency stemmed from the concern that technology will deter the research and discovery of new fundamental information. This concern is not unwarranted. Not only does more fundamental information encourage extraction of information from order flow, but once order flow analysis starts, it feeds on itself.
The next result shows that, as long as price information is low or order flow analysis is not too large, both types of analysis increase the ratio of the information content C to the noise D. This increases the marginal value of order flow information, relative to fundamental information. Thus, fundamental analysis complements order flow information and order flow information complements itself.
Result 2 Complementarity in order flow analysis:
If Ω xt < τ 0 + Ω f t and either
Unlike fundamental analysis, the rise in order-flow analysis can increase the value of further order-flow analysis. For fundamental information, the increase in |C t /D t | makes additional fundamental information less valuable. This result resembles the strategic substitutability in information identified by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , in a model with a different information structure. But for order flow information, the effect is the opposite. More precise average order flow information (higher Ω xt ) can increase (C t /D t ) 2 , which is the marginal rate of substitution of order flow information for fundamental information. The rise in the relative value of order flow data is what makes investors shift data analysis from fundamental to order flow when others do more order flow analysis. That is complementarity. 6
Complementarity comes from a rise in the price signal-to-noise ratio. From (10), we know that C t is proportional to 1
As either type of information precision (Ω f t or Ω xt ) improves, the uncertainty about next period's dividend innovation V ar[ỹ t |I it ] declines, and C t increases. D t is the coefficient on noisex t . The price impact of uninformative trades D t may also increase with information, as we explain below. But conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that D t does not rise at a rate faster than C t so that the ratio C t /D t , which is the signal-to-noise ratio of prices, and the marginal value of order flow precision, increases with more information.
Intuitively, higher signal-to-noise (more informative) prices encourage order flow trading because the value of order flow analysis comes from the ability to better extract the signal from prices. In this model (as in most information processing problems), it is easier to clear up relatively clear signals than very noisy ones. So the aggregate level of order-flow analysis improves the signal clarity of prices, which makes order-flow analysis more valuable. 7
Market Efficiency and Future Information Risk
To understand how the value of information changes, we consider marginal changes in fundamental and order flow analysis. We begin by exploring the effect on each price coefficient (C t , D t ) separately. Then, we turn to the question of how analysis affects the ratio (C/D) 2 , which governs the marginal rate of substitution between order flow and fundamental analysis. Taken together, these results paint a picture of technological progress having mixed effects on market efficiency. The proofs are in Appendix B.
Result 3 Both fundamental and order flow analysis increase price informativeness. If r−g > 0 and (τ x + Ω xt ) is sufficiently small, then ∂C t /∂Ω f t > 0 and ∂C t /∂Ω xt > 0.
The more information investors have, the more information is reflected in the risky asset price. While the idea that dividend (fundamental) information improves price informativeness is unsurprising, the question of whether order-flow speculation improves or reduces price informativeness is not obvious. It turns 6 With a linear information constraint, or a simple cost function for Kt, the same intuition holds. With linearity, there is a secular shift to order flow information acquisition once
falls below −1. After that, the equilibrium level of the two types of information will be such that investors remain indifferent.
7 When we consider a marginal change in analysis choice in the infinite future (a change in the steady state), the results are similar, but with more complex necessary conditions. out that they increase the information content because by selling the asset when the price is high for non-fundamental reasons and buying when the price is erroneously low, they make it easier to extract information from prices. Better informed traders who learn both from independent signals and from prices, therefore have better information, take more aggressive positions which in turn, cause the price so reveal even more information.
Liquidity here is the impact a non-informational trade has on price. A liquid market is one where one can buy or sell large quantities, in a way that is not correlated with dividends, without moving price by much. The next two results together show that information today and information tomorrow have opposite effects on today's liquidity. These opposite results are why it was important to use a dynamic model to think about the long run effects on increasing information technology.
Result 4 If order flow is not too volatile, then both fundamental and order flow analysis
The contemporaneous effect is that both types of analysis can increase liquidity. The rationale is that both types of traders trade against non-informational trades and mitigate their price impact. Order flow investors profit by identifying and trading against non-informational trades. Non-informational trades that are clearly identifiable, will find eager counterparties, and will have little price impact. Fundamental traders buy when the price is low, relative to their fundamental information. This is exactly the same states where hedgers are selling. By taking the other side of the hedging trade, both types of traders mitigate hedgers' price impact. Lower price impact is higher liquidity.
Why would this result be reversed if order flow was volatile (τ x low)? A low τ x means that prices are very noisy. When information improves, noise trades can be mis-attributed to agents having fundamental information. This mis-attribution causes prices to move more. In other words, the presence of informed traders makes others more hesitant to trade against hedging trades, increasing their price impact. Both components of this contemporaneous effect are present in static models as well.
Another way of understanding liquidity is to think about it as a change in the quantity of risk per share. More information of either type today makes the dividend less risky -lower conditional varianceand helps to forecast tomorrow's price. If one share of the asset involves bearing little risk, then market investors don't need much price concession to induce them to hold a little extra risk. When one share is riskier, then inducing the market to buy one more share requires them to take on lots of risk, which requires a large price concession. This effect shows up in (11), the formula for D t , which depends negatively on V ar[p t+1 +d t |I it ] −1 , the variance of the asset payoff. Assets with more uncertain payoffs have more negative D t , which means selling or buying a share has more price impact. This risk-based interpretation helps explain the next result about how future information affects today's liquidity.
Result 5 More future information reduces liquidity today. If |C t+1 /D t+1 | is sufficiently large, then
The reason that future information can reduce liquidity is because it makes future price p t+1 more sensitive to future information and thus harder to forecast today. If tomorrow, many investors will trade on precise (t + 1) information, then tomorrow's price will be very sensitive to tomorrow's dividend information y t+1 and tomorrow's order flow information x t+1 . In other words, both C t+1 and D t+1 will be high.
But investors today do not know what will be learned tomorrow. Therefore, tomorrow's analysis makes tomorrow's price (p t+1 ) more sensitive to shocks that today's investors are uninformed about. Because tomorrow's price is a component of the payoff to the asset purchased at date t, today's investors face high
. This is what we call future information risk. Invoking the logic above, a riskier asset has a less liquid market. We can see this relationship in the formula for D t (eq 11) where V ar[p t+1 +d t |I it ] shows up in the first term. Thus, future information reduces today's liquidity.
At this point, the assumption that assets are long-lived becomes essential. In a repeated static model, payoffs are exogenous. Without dynamics, information learned tomorrow cannot affect payoff risk today.
Thus, the contribution of using a long-lived asset model to think about information choice is all the results that depend on future information risk.
We can see the relationship between tomorrow's price coefficients and future information risk in the formula for the variance of the asset payoff:
We know that time-t information increases period-t information content C t . Similarly, time t+1 information increases C t+1 . Future information may increase or decrease D t+1 . But as long as C t+1 /D t+1 is large enough, the net effect of t + 1 information is to increase C 2 t+1 τ
Since future information cannot affect today's dividend uncertainty V ar[ỹ t |I it ], the net effect of future information is to raise today's payoff variance. What this means economically is that tomorrow's prices will be more responsive to tomorrow's fundamental and order flow shocks. That is what makes the price more uncertain today.
In our dynamic model, information improves today and improves again tomorrow. That means the static effect and dynamic effect are competing. 8 The net effect of the two is sometimes positive, sometimes negative. But it is never as clear-cut as what a static information model would suggest. What we learn is that information technology efficiency and liquidity are not synonymous. If fact, because it makes prices more informative, financial technology can also make markets function in a less liquid way.
Analysis and Price in the Long-Run
The result that order flow analysis feeds on itself suggests that in the long run, order flow analysis will crowd out fundamental analysis. But that does not happen. When order flow precision (Ω xt ) is high, the necessary conditions for Proposition 2 break down. The next result tells us that, in the long run as information becomes abundant, growth in fundamental and order-flow analysis becomes balanced. For this result, the long-lived asset assumption is crucial.
Result 6 High-Information Limit As K t → ∞, both analysis choices Ω f t and Ω xt tend to ∞ such that See Appendix B for the proof and an expression (90) for the lower bound on τ 0 .
It is not surprising that fundamental analysis will not out-strip order flow analysis (part (a)). We know that more fundamental analysis lowers the value of additional fundamental analysis and raises the value of order flow analysis. This is the force that prompts order flow analysis to explode at lower levels of
But what force restrains the growth of order flow analysis? The reason that fundamental analysis cannot become a negligible fraction of order flow analysis (part (b)) is that, if it did, the price signalto-noise ratio (C t /D t ) 2 would fall; this would reduce the incentive to acquire order flow information. In sum, if fundamental analysis is too scarce, the value of mining order flow falls, and brings the two types of analysis back to some fixed proportion.
This balanced growth result only arises in a model with long-lived assets. What makes the growth of (C t /D t ) 2 slow down as information becomes abundant is the rise of future information risk. Result 5 teaches us that when K t is high, future information risk (high V ar[p t+1 +d t |I it ]) increases the price impact of uninformed trades |D t |. That V ar[p t+1 +d t |I it ] term does not show up in the equation (10) for C t because more uncertain future prices do not increase the weight on dividend signals today. Thus, it is future information risk, which becomes particularly large at high levels of financial technology, that causes D t to grow as fast as C t , which brings order flow analysis back into proportion with fundamental analysis. In the Appendix, Lemma 4 shows formally that (C t /D t ) 2 is bounded above by the inverse of future information risk. When assets are not long-lived, their payoffs are exogenous, future information risk is zero, and (C t /D t ) 2 can growth without bound. Without a long-lived asset, the balanced growth path does not exist.
Persistent order flow or information about future events.
A key to many of our results is that the growth of financial technology creates more and more future information risk. This is the risk that arises because shocks that affect tomorrow's prices are not learnable today. This raises the question: What if these shocks could be learned about today? What if order flow shocks were not independent? What if information about future dividend shocks was available today?
Would future information processing still increase risk?
Yes, as long as there is still some uncertainty and thus something to be learned in the future, future information will still create risk for returns today. Tomorrow's price would depend on the new information, learned tomorrow about shocks that will materialize in t + 2 or t + 3. That new information observed in t + 1 will affect t + 1 prices. That new future information, only released in t + 1 cannot be known at time t. This future information becomes a new source of unlearnable risk. The general point is this: As long as new information keeps arriving, it creates risk. The risk is that before the information arrives, one does not know it and can not know it, no matter how much analysis is done. And yet, this information yet to arrive will affect future prices in a uncertain way. When information processing technology is poor, the poorly-processed information has little price effect. Thus future information poses little risk. When information processing improves, the risk of unknown future information grows.
Of course, if order flow were persistent, then signals aboutx t would be payoff relevant. Thex t signal would be informative aboutx t+1 , which affects the price p t+1 and thus the payoff of a time t risky asset.
Learning directly about asset future asset payoffs is fundamentally different than learning about demand shocks that only affect the interpretation of the current price. In such a model, agents would attempt to distinguish the persistent and transitory components of order flow. The persistent, payoff-relevant component would play the role of dividend information in this model. The transitory component of order flow would play the role of the i.i.d.x t shock in this setting.
Parameter Choice
The results so far reveal that low-tech investors do analyze fundamentals; as financial technology develops, order flow analysis takes off and feeds on itself; and eventually, with advanced technology, both types of analysis grow proportionately. Although we've traced out forces affecting price informativeness and liquidity, we don't know whether these effects are large or small and which dominate. To explore these issues, we need to solve a calibrated model numerically.
Our calibration strategy is to estimate our equilibrium price equation on recent asset price and dividend data. By choosing model parameters that match the pricing coefficients, we ensure that we have the right average price, average dividend, volatility and dividend-price covariance at the simulation end point. What we do not calibrate to is the evolution of these moments over time. The time path of price and price coefficients are over-identifying moments that we can use to evaluate model performance.
First, we describe the data used for model calibration. Next, we describe moments of the data and model that we match to identify model parameters. Most of these moments comes from estimating a version of our price equation (7) and choosing parameters to match the price coefficients in the model with the data. In the next section, we report the results.
Data We use two datasets that both come from CRSP. The first is the standard S&P 500 market capitalization index based on the US stock market's 500 largest companies. 9 The dataset consists of: the value-weighted price level of the index p t , and the value-weighted return (p t + d t )/p t−1 , where d t is dividends. Both are reported at a monthly frequency for the period 1999.12-2015.
Given returns and prices, we impute dividends per share as
Both the price series and the dividend series are seasonally adjusted and exponentially detrended. As prices are given in index form, they must be scaled to dividends in a meaningful way. The annualized dividend per share is computed for each series by summing dividends in 12 month windows. Then, in the same 12-month window, prices are adjusted to match this yearly dividend-price ratio.
Finally, because the price variable described above is really an index, and this index is an average of prices, the volatility of the average will likely underestimate the true volatility of representative stock prices. In order to find an estimate for price volatility at the asset level, we construct a quarterly time 9 As a robustness check, we redo the calibration using a broader index: a composite of the NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. This is a market capitalization index based on a larger cross-section of the market -consisting of over 8000 companies (as of 2015). The results are similar. Moment estimates are within about 20% of each other. This is close enough that the simulations differ imperceptibly. Results are available upon request.
series of the average S&P constituent stock price for the period 2000-2015. Compustat gives us the S&P constituent tickets for each quarter. From CRSP, we extract each company's stock price for that quarter.
Moments Using the price data and implied dividend series, we estimate the dividend AR(1) process (2) and the linear price equation (7). We letỹ t and Dx t be regression residuals. We estimate A = 16.03, C = 7.865 and D = −5.7. We can then map these estimates into the underlying model parameters G, τ −1
x , τ −1 0 , µ and χ x , using the model solutions (8), (9), (10) and (11), as well as
Of course, in the model, A t , C t and D t take on different values at different dates t. So we need to choose a theoretical date t at which to calibrate. Since our model requires solution by backwards induction, we choose the last date T . Given t + 1 parameters, we can solve the model and find t parameters. Therefore, we use the empirical price coefficient estimates to tell us the model coefficients at the end of our simulation, denoted A T , C T and D T . We use steady state solutions of the model to map these estimated coefficients back into model parameters. 10 Note that B is constant because it is a simple function of fixed parameters. The first five parameters in Table 1 are calibrated to match the model and data values of the five equations above. This is an exactly identified system. The riskless rate is set to match a 3% net return.
The last parameter is risk aversion. Risk aversion clearly matters for the level of the risky asset price. But it is tough to identify. The reason for the difficulty is that if we change risk aversion, and then re-calibrate the mean, persistence and variance parameters to match price coefficients and variance at the new risk aversion level, the predictions of the model are remarkably stable. Roughly, doubling variance and halving risk aversion mostly just redefines units of risk. Therefore, we use the risk aversion ρ = 0.10 in what follows and explore other values to show that the results do not depend on this choice. This ρ implies a relative risk aversion that is 0.65, not particularly high. In the appendix, we show an example of an alternative parameterization with even lower risk aversion, show how the other parameters change, and show that it yields similar results. We explore variations in other parameters as well.
Computation The one thing that changes at each date is the total information capacity K t . We start the routine with K T = 10. 11 In each period prior to that, we reduce K t by 0.02. So if the last period is denoted T , then K T −1 = 9.99 and K T −2 = 9.98. We simulate the model in this fashion for 500 periods. We solve the model by choosing a final date T and using our estimated price function parameters to initialize the backwards induction algorithm. We use the A T , B T , C T and D T from the data and our 10 Steady state solutions means solutions to a model where we believe that forever after that information would remain constant Kt+1 = Kt and price would have stable coefficients, At+1 = At, Ct+1 = Ct and Dt+1 = Dt.
11 We checked the robustness of alternative KT values and found that it makes no difference to our conclusions. For example, when we used KT = 5, we found that the results look as if we'd simulated the results with KT = 10 and truncated the time series plot where Kt reaches 5. The other calibrated parameters are identical when we vary K, except for χx, which moves approximately proportionately with KT . For example, for Kt = 5, χx falls by about one-half, from 0.68 to 0.31. calibrated parameters to solve backwards for A t , B t , C t and D t , t = T − 1, · · · , 1. Knowing time-t price coefficients, we can solve for optimal information choices Ω f t and Ω xt . Then, we use the time-t solutions and our model solution to get t − 1 information choices and price coefficients, and so forth. At each date, we are using a function minimization routine that finds the zeros of a non-linear equation in Ct Dt .
Multiple Equilibria The non-linear equation in
Ct Dt that characterizes the solution can have multiple solutions. It turns out, that for the parameter values we explore, this equation has only one real root.
Numerical Results
A common concern is that, as financial technology improves, the extraction of information from order flow will crowd out original research, and in so doing, will reduce the informativeness of market prices. On the flip side, if technology allows investors to identify uninformed trades and take the other side of those trades, such activity is thought to improve market liquidity. While both arguments have some grain of truth in them, countervailing equilibrium effects mean that neither conjecture is correct.
We begin by revisiting the forces that make order flow information more valuable over time, this time, assigning a magnitude to the effect. Then, we explore why the change from information production to extraction does not harm price informativeness. Next, we use our numerical model to tease out the reasons for stagnating market liquidity, despite a surge in activity that looks like liquidity provision. Finally, we ask whether the model contradicts long-run trend in equity premia and explore the possibility of biased technological change. Total Information K t Fundamental Analysis + ft Order-.ow Analysis + xt Figure 1 shows that order flow analysis is scarce initially. Consistent with Result 1, we see that when information processing ability is limited, almost all of that ability is allocated to processing fundamental information. But once fundamental information is sufficiently abundant, order-flow analysis takes off.
Transition from Fundamental to Order Flow Analysis
Not only does order flow processing surge, but it increases by so much that, the amount of fundamental information declines, even though the total ability to process information has improved. Once it takes off, order flow trading quickly comes to dominate fundamentals-based trading.
Exploring alternative parameter values reveals that this result is quite robust. Ω xt consistently surpasses
There are parameters for which C t /D t never exceeds √ χ x , but even in those cases, Ω xt increases faster, while Ω f t is concave. Thus, over time, the growth of fundamental analysis is slowing down. Related trends in data The shift from fundamental to order flow analysis in our model should show up empirically as a change in investment strategies. Indeed, there is some evidence that funds have shifted their strategy over time, in a way that is plausibly consistent with our predictions. In the TASS database, many hedge funds report that their fund has a "fundamental", "mixture," or "quantitative" strategy. Figure 2 illustrates the evolutions of assets under management, by fund, and in total, for these different styles of funds. While other trends are also apparent, one clear trend is that fundamental analysis is waning in recent years, in favor of strategies based on market data. This shift in reported style suggests a transformation in the way information technologies are used in finance.
Another quite different indicator that points to the growing importance of order flow data comes from the frequency of web searches. Google trends reports the frequency of searches that involve specific search terms. Figure 3 shows that from 2004 to 2016, the frequency of searches for information about "order flow" has risen roughly 3-fold. This is not an overall increase in attention to asset market information.
In contrast, the frequency of searches for information about "fundamental analysis" fell by about one-half over the same time period. Much of the trade against order flow takes the form of algorithmic trading. This happens for a couple of reasons. First, while firm fundamentals are slow-moving, order flow can reverse rapidly. Therefore, mechanisms that allow traders to trade quickly are more valuable for fast-moving order flow based strategies. Second, while fundamental information is more likely to be textual, partly qualitative, and varied in nature, order flow is more consistently data-oriented and therefore more amenable to algorithmic analysis. This rapid transition is another feature of the data our model can explain.
Price Informativeness
Price informativeness measures of financial market efficiency in the sense that efficient prices aggregate all the information known to market participants about future firm fundamentals. Informative prices are important because they can inform firm managers' investment decisions and make equity compensation a useful incentive tool by aligning firm value and equity compensation. Finally, informative prices allocate new capital to the most productive firms.
Prices are informative if a change in future dividends is reflected in the price. Our equilibrium price solution (7) reveals that this marginal price impact dp t /dỹ t is C t . As the productivity of financial analysis rises, and more information is acquired and processed, the informativeness of the price (C t ) rises. Both fundamental analysis and order flow analysis have the same objective, to help investors better discern the true value of the asset. Thus both raise price informativeness.
The solid line labeled C t in Figure 5 confirms that as financial analysis becomes more productive, informativeness rises. The effect of a one-unit change in the dividend innovation, which is about 2 standard deviations, increases the price by between 0 and 8 units. Since the average price level is about 80, this 2 standard deviation shock to dividends produces a negligible price change for very low levels of technology and a 10% price rise when financial technology becomes more advanced. Price Info C t Illiquidity jD t j Marg. Value of Order-.ow (
Related trends in data Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2013) measure a long-run rise in equity price informativeness. They measure price informativeness using a coefficient from a regression of future earnings (at 1-year, 3-year and 5-year horizons) on the current ratio of market value to book value. Over the period 1960-2010, they find a 60% rise in three-year price informativeness and an 80% rise in five year price informativeness, both of which are highly statistically significant.
Our claim is not that our model explains all of this phenomenon, or that we can match the timing or magnitude of the increase. We only wish to suggest that our predictions are not at odds with other long-run trends in financial markets. This is a model with only one risky asset, with no frictions, no habits or low-frequency risks. It is deliberately kept simple, in order to explore the workings of a new mechanism governing long run shifts in trading strategies. In reality, there are many assets and many sectors, which each go through the transition from fundamental to order flow research at different times. The rise in financial technology does not prompt more analysis of all assets at all times. Because of complementarity in order flow analysis, more information drives up the price of one or a few assets, leaving others unstudied.
Thus, the average rise in price informativeness is overstated by the 1-asset model. 12
Price Impact of Trades (Liquidity)
Market liquidity is an important object of study in finance (Hasbrouck, 2007) . Liquidity is particularly important in the debate on financial technology because it is one of the most common arguments in defense of order flow based trading strategies. The claim is that traders who identify uninformed order flow and offer to take the other side of those orders provide market liquidity.
A common metric of market liquidity is the sensitivity of an asset's price to a buy or sell order. If a buy order causes a large increase in the asset price and conversely a sell order causes a large fall, then buying and selling this asset is costly. In such a market, trading strategies that require frequent or large trades would have a harder time generating a profit. In our model, price impact is the impact of a oneunit hedging trade (dp t /d(−x t )). We consider a hedging trade because the alternative is considering an information-based trade. The impact of an information-based trade would reflect the fundamental (future dividend) which must have moved to change the information. That question of how much a change in the fundamental changes price is one we already explored. That is price informativeness. The linear price solution (7) reveals that price impact is dp t /d(−x t ) = −D t .
Looking at the dashed line in Figure Flat liquidity is a result of two competing forces. Recall from Section 2 that the liquidity of a risky asset is determined by the riskiness (uncertainty) of its payoff. Purchases or sales of assets with more uncertain payoffs have larger price effects. Result 4 tells us that more information today reduces uncertainty about dividendsd t , which in turn reduces the price impact of non-fundamental trades, improving liquidity. But
Result 5 tells us that if information technology is advanced tomorrow, then tomorrow's shocks will have a large effect on tomorrow's price, which makes today's payoff risky and today's liquidity low. The reason liquidity changes so little is that the static force (r/(r − G))V ar[ỹ t |I it ](C t /D t ) and the dynamic force 12 Our framework could come closer to the data with multiple assets. What we cannot do with multiple assets is characterize the long run growth path that is central to this paper's results. Because of the complementarity in order flow processing, many such growth paths may exist. Therefore, we stick with our transparent one-asset model, with clear predictions, at the expense of being able only to make qualitative comparisons with data. Figure 6 : Liquidity Fragility Grows. Figure plots |Dt| where there are three one-time, zero-probability, unanticipated uncertainty shocks. Each shock is a change in expected precision τ0,t+1 to 1/2 · τ0, which is then not realized at t + 1. First, our liquidity measure is the price impact of a non-informational trade. That is not the same as the price impact of an institutional trader who will often be trading on information. Second, in many cases, the way institutional traders have reduced their price impact is to find uninformed order flow to trade against. To the extent that reduced price impact reflects more market making and less direct trading on information, this reduced impact is consistent with our long-run order flow analysis trend.
Fragile Liquidity Although liquidity remains mostly flat as technology improves, liquidity becomes more fragile, meaning that it is more sensitive to changes in model parameters. For example, suppose agents face a one-time increase in uncertainty. Specifically, investors find out that the variance of next period's dividend innovations τ −1 0,t+1 will be doubled, only for one period, and never again. The actual high variance shock is never realized, making this a pure belief shock. Figure 6 shows that when information technology is poor, uncertainty has little effect on liquidity. But when information technology is very productive, the same change in uncertainty results in a dramatic fall in market liquidity.
Liquidity is fragile in response to other shocks as well. A similar exercise where the cost of order flow processing (χ x ) surges for one period produces similar outcomes. See appendix for detailed results.
Trend in the Equity Premium
Our focus is on how technological change affects trading strategies and market efficiency. But it is useful to understand whether this mechanism is consistent or at odds with long-run trends in the equity premium.
The idea that information reduces risk, which lowers the return on risky assets is an old one. However, exploring the magnitude of that decline in our setting offers some insight about the magnitude of the 13 A version of this effect can arise in a dynamic model with only fundamental analysis (see Cai (2016b) ).
information trend in the model. If the model's equity premium needed to fall by some outrageous amount, in order to see any effect on price informativeness or liquidity, it would diminish the relevance of our mechanism. Risk premium
Instead, Figure 7 shows that the decline in the risk premium predicted by the model is quite modest.
The risk premium falls from a maximum of around 6% to 5% by the end. Of course, replicating the level of the risk premium is not a success. That is nearly a by-product of calibrating the model to match the price regression coefficients in (7). This calibration approach implies that the model matches the pricedividend ratio, and by extension, comes close to matching the equity premium. However, the decline in the premium is related the growth in information processing. It tells us that the amount of information needed to explain the declining equity premium is consistent with the amount needed to explain growing price informativeness and flat liquidity. This is an over-identifying moment that lends support to our modeling and calibration approach. Jones (2002) documents that the equity premium is 1% lower in the 2000's than it was in the early 1900's. Our results are also a similar magnitude to those of Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) who report that the price-dividend ratio rose from 3 to 4 in the late 20th century. They estimate a structural asset pricing model with regime switches in volatility and conclude that, because of the fall in macro risk in the early 1990's, the equity premium shifted down by 1.5%.
Related trends in data

Unbalanced technological change
We have modeled technological progress that increases the potential precision of fundamental or order flow information equally. But it is quite possible that technological progress has not been balanced. The concern is that the productivity of order flow analysis has grown faster than fundamental analysis, because fundamental information tends to be more textual or qualitative. To explore this possibility, we take an extreme view of the imbalance and consider a world where the only efficiency growth is in order flow data processing. The truth is likely somewhere between this unbalanced growth model and the balanced growth model we analyzed before.
When only order flow data processing improves, a few things change (Figure 8 ). First, fundamental information analysis falls monotonically, rather than rising and then falling. This is simply because when order flow analysis becomes more productive, it makes fundamental information processing strictly less attractive. Also, price informativeness (C/|D|) is mostly flat. In contrast, with balanced growth, it was steadily increasing. The trajectory of C/|D| is flatter because, while both types of information processing make prices clearer signals, fundamental information processing improves signal quality by more.
What is surprising is that C/|D| does not fall. Even C alone does not fall. Even though the discovery of new information about future dividends Ω f t falls precipitously, dividend information is still more heavily weighted (C) and more clearly reflected (C/|D|) in prices. Order flow traders are adept at inferring what others know from prices. This inference makes them well-informed aboutỹ t , albeit indirectly. If many traders have precise knowledge of order flow, the average trader ends up being well-informed aboutỹ t , even if less research onỹ t was done by the market. The net result of less research but more learning through prices is an increase in total information. This shows up in prices as a higher price impact C of changes in dividend innovations.
In short, our main conclusions are unaltered. Liquidity is still flat. Market efficiency does not plummet, by either measure, even through order flow analysis crowds out fundamental analysis. The unbalanced change simply affects the rate at which market efficiency evolves. 
Real Economic Effects
We're argued that the growth in financial technology has transformed the financial sector and affected financial market efficiency in unexpected ways. But why should we care about financial market efficiency?
What are the consequences for real economic activity? In this section, we provide a sketch of two channels through which changes in informativeness and price impact can alter the efficiency of real business investment.
Manager incentive effects
The key friction in the first spillover model is that the manager's effort choice is unobserved by equity investors. The manager exerts costly effort only because he is compensated with equity. The manager only has an incentive to exert effort if the value of his equity is responsive to his effort. Because of this, the efficiency of the manager's effort choice depends on asset price informativeness.
Of course, this friction reflects the fact that the wage is not an unconstrained optimal contract. The optimal compensation for the manager is to pay him for effort directly or make him hold all equity in the firm. We do not model the reasons why this contract is not feasible because it would distract from our main point. Our stylized sketch of a model is designed to show how commonly-used compensation contracts that tie wages to firm equity prices (e.g., options packages) also tie price informativeness to optimal effort.
Time is discrete and infinite. There is a single firm whose profitsd t depend on a firm manager's labor choice l t . Specifically,d t = g(l t ) +ỹ t , where g is increasing and concave andỹ t ∼ N (0, τ −1 0 ) is unknown at t. Because effort is unobserved, the manager's pay w t is tied to the equity price p t of the firm: w t =w + p t .
However, effort is costly. We normalize the units of effort so that a unit of effort corresponds to a unit of utility cost. Insider trading laws prevent the manager from participating in the equity market. Thus the manager's objective is
The firm pays out all its profits as dividends each period to its shareholders. Firm equity purchased at time t is a claim to the present discounted stream of future profits {d t ,d t+1 . . .}.
The preferences, endowments, budget constraint and information choice sets of investors are the same as before. Order flow signals are defined as before. Fundamental analysis now generates signals of the form η f it = g(l t ) +ỹ t +˜ f it , where the signal noise is˜ f it ∼ N (0, Ω f t ). Investors choose the precision Ω f t of this signal, as well as their order flow signal Ω xt . Equilibrium is defined as before, with the additional condition that the manager effort decision maximizes (18).
Solution As before, the asset market equilibrium has a linear equilibrium price:
Notice that since dividends are not persistent, d t−1 is no longer relevant for the t price
The firm manager chooses his effort to maximize (18). The first order condition is C t g (l t ) = 1, which yields an equilibrium effort level l t = (g ) −1 (1/C t ). Notice that the socially optimal level would set the marginal utility cost of effort equal to the marginal product g (l t ) = 1. When C t is below one, managers under-provide effort, relative to the social optimum because their stock compensation moves less than one-to-one with the true value of their firm.
Similar to before, the equilibrium level of price informativeness C is
Thus, as more information is analyzed, dividend uncertainty (V ar[g(l t )+ỹ t |I it ]) falls, C t rises and managers are better incentivized to exert optimal effort. While the model is stylized and the solution presented here is only a sketch, it is designed to clarify why trends in financial analysis matter for the real economy.
The most obvious limitation of the model is its single asset. One might wonder whether the effect would disappear if the asset's return was largely determined by aggregate risk, which is out of the manager's control. However, if there were many assets, one would want to rewrite the compensation contract so that the manager gets rewarded for high firm-specific returns. This would look like benchmarked performance pay. If the contract focused on firm-specific performance, the resulting model would look similar to the single asset case here.
In short, this model suggests that trends in the financial sector are all positive for real economic efficiency because more analysis of either type makes price more informative and thereby improves incentives.
Equity Issuance Cost
The second real spillover highlights a downside of financial technology growth. More information technology creates future information risk, which raises the risk of holding equity, making capital more costly for firms.
Suppose that a firm has a profitable investment opportunity and wants to issue new equity to raise capital for that investment. For every dollar of capital invested, the firm can produce an infinite stream of dividends d t . Dividends follow the same stochastic process as described in the original model. However, the firm needs funds to invest and raises those finds by issuing equity. The firm chooses a number of shares s to maximize the total revenue raised (maximize output). Each share sells at price p, which is determined by the investment market equilibrium, minus an investment or issuance cost:
The firm makes its choice conditional on the same prior information that all the investors have. But does not condition on p. It does not take price as given. Rather, the firm choosess, taking into account its impact on the equilibrium price. The change in issuance is permanent and unanticipated. The rest of the model is the same as the dynamic model in section 1.
Solution Given the new asset supplys, the asset market solution and information choice solution to the problem are the same as before. But how the firm choosess depends on how new issuance affects the asset price. When the firm issues new equity, all asset market participants are aware that new shares are coming online. Equity issuance permanently changes the known supply of the assets. Supplys enters the asset price in only one place in the equilibrium pricing formula, through A t . Recall from 8 that
Taking A t+1 as given for the moment, dA t /ds = −ρV ar[p t+1 +d t |I]/r. In other words, the impact of a one-period change in asset supply depends on the conditional variance (the uncertainty about) the future asset payoff, p t+1 +d t . Recall from the discussion of price impact of trades in Section 4.3 that in a dynamic model, more information analysis reduces dividend uncertainty but can result in more uncertainty about future prices. These two effects largely offset each other. Figure 9 plots the modest increase and decrease in payoff risk from these competing effects on the price impact of issuing new equity. To give the units of the price impact some meaning, the issuance cost is Price Impact dA t =d7 s scaled by the average dividend payment so that it can be interpreted as the change in the price-dividend ratio from a one-unit change in equity supply. Thus a one-unit increase in issuance reduces the asset price by an amount equal to 4 months of dividends, on average.
We learn that technological progress in information analysis -of either type -initially makes asset payoffs slightly more uncertain, which makes it more costly to issue new equity. When we now take into account that the increase in asset supply is permanent, the effect of issuance is amplified, relative to the one-period (fixed A t+1 ) case. But when analysis becomes sufficiently productive, issuance costs decrease again, as the risk-reducing power of more precise information dominates.
Again, a key limitation of the model is its single asset. With multiple assets, one firm's issuance is a tiny change in the aggregate risk supply. But the change in the supply of firm-specific risk looks similar to this problem. If one were to evaluate this mechanism quantitatively, the magnitude would depend on how much the newly issued equity loads on idiosyncratic risk versus aggregate risk.
Conclusion
Technological progress is the driving force behind most models of long-run economic growth. Yet it is surprisingly absent in models of the financial economy. We explore the consequences of a simple deterministic increase in the productivity of information processing in the financial sector. While studies have documented an increase in price informativeness (Bai, Philippon, and Savov, 2013) , we know of no theories that explore the consequences of such changes on market equilibrium or efficiency.
We find that when the financial sector becomes more efficient at processing information, it changes the incentives to acquire information about future dividends (fundamentals) versus order flow (non fundamental shocks to price). Thus a simple rise in information processing productivity can explain a transformation of financial analysis from a sector that primarily investigates the fundamental profitability of firms to a sector that does a little fundamental analysis but mostly concentrates on acquiring and processing client order flow. This is consistent with suggestive evidence that the nature of financial analysis and associated trading strategies have changed.
Many feared that this technological transformation was harming market efficiency, while others argued that markets are more liquid/efficient than ever before. The concern was that the decline of fundamental analysis would compromise price informativeness. We do not find that to be the case. Although fundamental analysis declines, price informativeness continues to rise. The reason is that even if many traders are extracting others' information, this still makes the average trader better informed and the price more informative. But the benefits of the technological transformation may also be overstated. The promise that traders standing ready to take the other side of uninformed traders would improve market liquidity is only half the story. What this narrative misses is that more informed traders in the future make prices react more strongly to new information, which makes future asset values riskier. This increase in risk makes traders move market prices by more and pushes market liquidity back down. The net effect could go either way and is likely to be small. While this project with its one simple driving force leaves many question unanswered, it also provides a tractable foundation on which to build, to continue exploring how and why asset markets are evolving, as financial technology improves.
A Model Solution Details
A.1 Bayesian Updating
To form the conditional expectation, E[fit|Iit], we need to use Bayes' law. But first, we need to know what signal investors extract from price, given their observed endowment exposure ht and their order-flow signal ηx. We can rearrange the the linear price equation (7) to write a function of the price is the dividend innovation plus mean zero noise:
, where the price signal and the signal precision are x . The price signal precision Ωpt is the inverse of this variance.
But conditional on hit and ηxit,xt is typically not a mean-zero random variable. Instead, investors use Bayes' law to combine their prior thatxt = 0, with precision τx with their endowment and order flow signals: hit with precision τ h and ηxit with precision Ωxit. The posterior mean and variance are
Since that is equal toỹt + Dt/Ct(xt − E[xt|ηxit]), the variance of price signal noise is (Dt/Ct) 2 V ar [xt|ηxit] . In other words, the precision of the price signal for agent i (and therefore for every agent since we are looking at symmetric information choice equilibria) is Ωpit ≡ (Ct/Dt) 2 (τx + Ωxit). Now, we can use Bayes' law for normal variables again to form beliefs about the asset payoff. We combine the prior µ, the price/order-flow information ηpit, and the fundamental signal η f it into a posterior mean and variance:
Average expectations and precisions: Next, we integrate over investors i to get the average conditional expectations. Begin by considering average price information. The price informativeness is Ωpit ≡ (Ct/Dt) 2 (τx + Ωxit). In principle, this can vary across investors. But since all are ex-ante identical, they make identical information decisions. Thus, Ωpit = Ωpt for all investors i. Since this precision is identical for all investors, we drop the i subscript in what follows. But the realized price signal still differs because signal realizations are heterogeneous. Since the signal precisions are the same for all agents, we can just integrate over signals to get the average signal:
, we can rewrite this as
Next, let's define some conditional variance / precision terms that simplify notation. The first term, Ωt, is the precision of future price plus dividend (the asset payoff). It comes from taking the variance of the pricing equation (7). It turns out that the variance Ω −1 t can be decomposed into a sum of two terms. The first,V , is the variance of the dividend innovation. This variance depends on information choices Ω f t and Ωxt. The other term Zt depends on future information choices through t + 1 price coefficients.V
The last equation (32) shows the relationship between Ω,V and Zt. This decomposition is helpful because we will repeatedly take derivatives where we take future choices (Zt) as given and vary current information choices (V ). Next, we can compute the average expectations
=V Ω f tỹt + Ωpt 1
A.2 Solving for equilibrium prices
The new price conjecture is
where the sequence of pricing coefficients is known at every date. The signals η f it and ηxit are the same as before, except that their precisions Ω f t and Ωxt may change over time if that is the solution to the information choice problem. The conditional expectation and variance ofỹt (26) and (27) are the same, except that the Ωpt term gets a t subscript now because Ωpt ≡ (Ct/Dt) 2 (τx + Ωxt). Likewise the mean and variance ofxt (24) and (25) are the same with a time-subscripted Ωxt. Thus, the average signals are the same with t-subscripts:
Since Ω −1 pt = (Dt/Ct) 2 V ar(x|I), we can rewrite this as
Solving for non-stationary equilibrium prices To solve for equilibrium prices, start from the portfolio first-order condition for investors (6) and equate total demand with total supply. The total risky asset demand (excluding hedging shocks) is
The market clearing condition equates the expression above to the residual asset supplyx +xt. The model assumes the asset supply is 1. We use the notationx here for more generality because then we can apply the result to the model with issuance costs where asset supply is a choice variable. Rearranging the market clearing condition (just multiplying through by ρΩ −1 t and bringing p terms to the left) yields
Solving for p and matching coefficients yields
Multiplying both sides by the inverse term:
and cancelling the 1 + B term on both sides leaves
Matching coefficients on dt yields:
Multiplying on both sides by the inverse term
and cancelling the last term on both sides yields
As long as r and G don't vary over time, it seems that a stationary solution for B at least exists. That stationary solution would be (9). Next, collecting all the terms inỹt
multiplying both sides by the first term inverse yields rCt − (1 + Bt+1)VtΩpt = (1 + Bt+1)VtΩ f t . Then dividing through by r and collecting terms inV (1 + Bt+1) yields Ct = (1/r)(1 + Bt+1)Vt(Ωpt + Ω f t ). Next, using the fact thatV
we get Ct = 1/r(1 + Bt+1)(1 − τ0Vt). Of course theV term has Ct and Dt in it. If we use the stationary solution for B (if r and G don't vary) then we can simplify to get
Lemma 1 If Ω f t > 0, then Ct > 0.
Proof: Using equation (48), it suffices to show that 1/(r − G) > 0 and (1 − τ0Vt) > 0. From the setup, we assumed that r > 1 and G < 1. By transitivity, r > G and r − G > 0. For the second term, we need to prove equivalently that τ0Vt < 1 and thus that τ0 <V −1 t . Recall from (29) thatV −1 = τ0 + Ω f t + Ωpt. Since Ω f t and Ωpt are defined as precisions, they must be non-negative. Furthermore, we supposed that Ω f t > 0. Thus, τ0 <V −1 t , which completes the proof. Finally, we collect terms inxt.
multiply by the inverse term, and the use Ωpt = (Ct/Dt) 2 (τx + Ωxt) to get
Then, adding (1 + B)C/DV Ωx to both sides, and substituting in B (stationary solution), we get
Of course, Dt still shows up quadratically, and also inVt. The future coefficient values Ct+1 and Dt+1 show up in Ωt.
Lemma 2 Dt < 0
Proof: Start from equation (53) in the LongRunEvolution Nov2016, substitute in (29) but does not set Ω f = 0. Since we will often treat the signal-to-noise ratio in prices as a single variable, we define
Also let: α ≡ ρr r−G
. This gives the general version of (56):
Then, use the budget constraint to express the first order conditions as (15). One can solve for both Ωx and Ω f in terms of ξ:
Now I can substitute both of these into equation (53), which fully determines ξ, in terms of exogenous variables.
First note that
where the left hand side is the objective function. So we know the maximized value of objective function solely as a function of ξ = C D
. Keep in mind that since we already imposed an optimality condition (??), this latter equation holds only at the optimum.
Substituting in for Ω f t and Ωxt from (54) and (55) yields an equation that implicitly defines ξ as a function of primitives, K and future equilibrium objects, embedded in Zt.
The left hand side must equal zero for the economy to be in equilibrium. However, all the coefficients K, χ f , χx, τ0, τx are assumed to be positive. Furthermore, Zt is a variance. Inspection of (31) reveals that it must be strictly positive. Thus, the only way that the equilibrium condition can possibly be equal to zero is if ξ < 0. Recall that ξ = Ct/Dt. The previous lemma proved that Ct > 0. Therefore, it must be that Dt < 0.
A.3 Solving Information Choices
Details of
Step 3: Compute ex-ante expected utility. Note that the expected excess return (E[pt+1 +dt|Iit] − ptr) depends on fundamental and supply signals, and prices, all of which are unknown at time t = 0. Because asset prices are linear functions of normally distributed shocks, E[pt+1 +dt|Iit] − ptr, is normally distributed as well. Thus, (
Computing its mean yields the expression in the text.
Step 4: Solve for fundamental information choices. Note that in expected utility (14), the choice variables Ω f t and Ωxt enter only through the posterior variance Ω −1 and through
Since there is a continuum of investors, and since V [pt+1 +dt − ptr|I Internet Appendix: Not for Publication
B Proofs
The next lemma proves the following: If no one has information about future dividends, then no one's trade is based on information about future dividends, thus the price cannot contain information about future dividends. Since Ct is the price coefficient on future dividend information, Ct = 0 means that the price is uninformative. In short, price cannot reflect information that no one knows.
Lemma 3 When information is scarce, price is uninformative: As Kt → 0, for any future path of prices (At+j, Bt+j, Ct+j and Dt+1, ∀j > 0), the unique solution for the price coefficient Ct is Ct = 0. Proof:
Step 1: As Ω f t → 0, prove Ct is always a solution.
Start with the equation for Dt (11). Substitute in for Ω using (32) and 1 + B = r/(r − G) and rewrite it as
Then, express Ct from (48) as Ct = 1/(r − G)Vt(V −1 t − τ0) and divide Ct by Dt, cancelling theVt/(r − G) term in each to get
If we substitute inV (29) and then set Ω f t = 0, we get
Then, we use the solution for price information precision Ωpt = (C/D) 2 (τx + Ωx) and multiply both sides by the denominator of the fraction to get
We can see right away that since both sides are multiplied by C/D, as Ω f t → 0, for any given future price coefficients Ct+1 and Dt+1, C = 0 is always a solution.
Step 2: prove uniqueness. Next, we investigate what other solutions are possible by dividing both sides by C/D:
This is a quadratic equation in C/D. Using the quadratic formula, we find
If we now take the limit as Ωxt → 0, the term inside the square root becomes negative, as long as r − G > 0. Thus, there are no additional real roots when Ωxt = 0.
Similarly, if Ωx is not sufficiently large, there are no real roots of (63), which proves that: As Ω f t → 0, if we take Ct+1 and Dt+1 as given, and Ωxt is sufficiently small, then the unique solution for the price coefficient C is C = 0.
Proof of Result 1 From lemma 3, we know that as Ct = 0. From the first order condition for information (15), we see that the marginal utility of order flow information relative to fundamental information (marginal rate of substitution) is a positive constant times (Ct/Dt) 2 . If Ct = 0, then ∂Uit/∂Ωxit is a positive constant time zero, which is zero. . This is positive, since we know that Ct > 0. That implies that the derivative of the inverse is ∂V /∂Ct = −V 2 2Ct/D 2 t (τx + Ωxt), which is negative. The ∂F/∂Ct term is therefore one plus a negative term. The result is positive, as long as the negative term is sufficiently small:
2 Ct/D 2 t (τx + Ωxt) < 1. We can express this as an upper bound on τx + Ωxt by rearranging the inequality to read: (τx + Ωxt) < 1/2(r − G)τ
Next, we see that ∂V −1 /∂Ω f t = 1. Thus, ∂V /∂Ω f t < 0. Since ∂F/∂V > 0, this guarantees that ∂F/∂Ω f t < 0.
Since the square is always positive, ∂V /∂Ωxt < 0. Since ∂F/∂V > 0, this guarantees that ∂F/∂Ωxt < 0. Finally, the implicit function theorem states that ∂Ct/∂Ω f t = −(∂F/∂Ω f t )/(∂F/∂Ct). Since the numerator is positive, the denominator is negative and there is a minus sign in front, ∂Ct/∂Ω f t > 0. Likewise, ∂Ct/∂Ωxt = −(∂F/∂Ωxt)/(∂F/∂Ct). Since the numerator is positive, the denominator is negative and there is a minus sign in front, ∂Ct/∂Ωxt > 0.
Proof of Result 4, part 1
Claim: If τx > ρr/(r − G) and Dt < 0, then ∂Dt/∂Ω f t > 0.
Proof: From market clearing:
Use Ωp = ( 
Then use (32) to substitute in for Ω −1 t :
In the above, the RHS, less the last term, is the loading on Xt+1, and the last term represents price feedback. We then define F ≡ L.H.S. of (67) − R.H.S. of (67). So that we can apply the implicit function theorem as
We begin by working out the denominator.
Recall the definitionVt
substituting this in to (73) yields
Substituting in the derivative ofV , we get
Observe that if
< 0, and r > G, then the numerator is positive (including the leading negative sign). The denominator is positive if the following expression is positive:
This is equivalent to
Lemma 2 , the denominator is positive. All that remains is to sign the numerator.
. Substituting the partial ofV into the partial of F yields
Combining terms,
We know from lemmas 1 and 2 that C t D t < 0. Since r > G, by assumption, ∂F/∂Ωx is negative (i.e., the C 2 D 2 factor does not change the sign). Applying the implicit function theorem tells us that ∂Dt/∂Ωxt > 0.
Proof of Result 2
The strategy for proving this result is to apply the implicit function theorem to the price coefficients that come from coefficient matching in the market-clearing equation. After equating supply and demand and matching all the coefficients oñ xt, we arrive at (11). Rearranging that equation gives us the expression for Ct/Dt in (59). If we subtract the right side of (59) from the left, we are left with an expression that is equal to zero in equilibrium, which we'll name F :
We compute
. In particular, we have:
We notice that (79) is
The inequality holds since we've proven that Ct/Dt < 0 and r > G. In the denominator, however, not all the terms are negative. The denominator of (79), divided by by τx
Ωx. Then, is it easy to see that if C/D is sufficiently close to zero, then −2 (80) 
, we can prove the above claim:
Now, combining the two previous claims, we have that if Ωx < τ0 + Ω f and Zt > Proof of Result 6a: Ω f t /Ωxt does not converge to 0 If Ω f t /Ωxt converges to ∞, then by the first order condition, it must be that ξ → ∞. It is sufficient to show that ξ → ∞ violates equation (57). Rearrange (57) to get
The term in square brackets is negative and the one outside is positive. Assume ξ → ∞. If Zt does not go to zero, then the negative term grows faster and the equality cannot hold. So it must be that Zt → 0. Using equation (31) of the draft, that requires that both Ct+1 → 0 and Dt+1 → 0. In order for Ct+1 to go to zero,V → τ −1 0 . But since ξ → ∞, from equation (29) in the main draft,V → 0, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Result 6b: As K → ∞, Ω f t /Ωxt does not converge to ∞ If Ω f t /Ωxt did converge to ∞ as K → ∞, then by the first-order condition (15), it would have to be that ξ → 0. So it suffices to show that Ω f t /Ωxt = ∞ is inconsistent with ξ = 0, in equilibrium.
Start from the equilibrium condition (56), which must be zero in equilibrium. If ξ → 0, then the first term goes to zero. The proof of lemma 4 proves, along the way, that (1 + ξZt) > 0. (Otherwise, (56) can never be zero because it is always negative.) Thus the second term Ωxtξ 2 (1 + ξZt) must be non-negative.
The third term Ω f t (1 + ξZt) also converges to ∞ because Ω f t → ∞ and (1 + ξZt) > 0. How do we know that Ω f t → ∞? In principle, Ω f t /Ωxt could become infinite either because Ω f t became infinite or because Ωxt goes to zero. But if Ωxt goes to zero and Ω f t is finite, then the information processing constraint (3), which requires that the weighted sum of Ω f t and Ωxt be K cannot be satisfied as K → ∞.
Since one term of (56) becomes large and positive and the other two are non-negative in the limit, the sum of these three terms cannot equal zero. Therefore, Ω f t /Ωxt → ∞ cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Result 6c: there exists an equilibrium where Ω f t /Ωxt converges to a constant. By the first order condition (15), we know that Ω f t /Ωxt converges to a constant, if and only if ξ converges to a constant. Thus, it suffices to show that there exists a constant ξ that is consistent with equilibrium, in the high-K limit.
Suppose ξ and Zt are constant in the high-K limit. In equation (57) as K → ∞, the last term goes to infinity, unless ξ → 1 Z t
. If the last term goes to infinity and the others remain finite, this cannot be an equilibrium because equilibrium requires that the left side of (57) is zero. Therefore, it must be that ξ → −1 Z t . The question that remains is whether ξ and Zt are finite constants, or whether one explodes and the other converges to zero, in the high-K limit.
, which is constant (ξ =ξ). Then Zt =Z is constant too. The rest of the proof checks to see if such a proposed constant-ξ solution is consistent with equilibrium. We do this by showing that ξ does not explode on contract as K increases. In other words, for ξ = −1 Z t to be stable and thus the ratio of fundamental to technical analysis to be stable, we need that ∂ξ/∂K → 0, in other words, ξ and therefore Ω f t /Ωxt converges to a constant as K → ∞.
Step 1: Derive dξ/dK: Start from the equilibrium condition for ξ (57) and apply the implicit function theorem:
So we have
Use equation 57 to write the numerator as
Now use this to rewrite dξ dK
Step 2: Show that dξ/dK → 0 as K → ∞, as long as X(·) →0 As K → ∞, it is clear that 1/2K → 0. As long as the term that multiplies 1/2K stays finite, the product will converge to zero. Since the numerator is just 1, the second term will be finite, as long as the denominator does not go to zero. Define
which is the denominator of the second fraction on the rhs of equation (83). Then if X → 0, 1/X is finite, then 1/2K * 1/X goes to zero as K gets large. Thus, we get that ∂ξ/∂K → 0 as K → ∞.
Step 3: X(·) → 0. To complete the proof, we need to show thatξ = − 1 Z which satisfies the equilirium condition (89) as K → ∞, does not cause X(·) = 0. We can check this directly: in equation (84), if ξ = − 1 Z t , the denominator of the last term becomes zero; so last term becomes infinite. The only term in (84) with opposite sign is the middle term, which is finite if ξ = C D is finite (the running assumption). If the last term of X tends to infinity and the only term of opposite sign is finite, the sum cannot be 0. Thus, forξ = − 1 Z , which is the limit attained in the limit as K → ∞, we have that X(ξ) = 0.
Step 4: As K → ∞, if (90) holds, the real, finite-ξ solution exists. From equations (29-32), as K → ∞ at least one of the two information choices goes to ∞, so with finite, non-zero
A word of interpretation here: Equation (32), which defines Ω −1 is the total future payoff risk. AsV → 0, it means the predictable part of this variance goes away as information capacity gets large. Zt, which is the unpredictable part, remains and governs liquidity, Dt. Next, solve (86) for Dt+1, backdate the solution 1 period, to get an expression for Dt, and equate it to the expression for Dt in (87). This implies that limK→∞ D =D is constant and equal to both of the following expressions
We can cancel Zt on both sides, which delivers a quadratic equation in one unknown inξ:
In order forξ to exist equation (89) requires that the expression inside the square root term of the quadratic formula (often written as (b 2 − 4ac)) not be negative. This imposes the parametric restriction
Rearranging this to put τ0 on the left delivers τ0 ≥ τ , where τ = 4τ
If we instead rearrange this to put τx on the left delivers τx ≥ τ , where τ = 4τ
Lemma 4 Balanced growth path depends on future information risk and long-lived assets. |Dt| ≥
, with strict inequality if K > 0.
Proof. Use equation (57) to write
Since we've proven that ξ ≤ 0 (lemma 2). And we know from lemma 1 that if K > 0, then Ct > 0 so that ξ < 0 with strict inequality. The other terms on the right side are strictly positive squares or positive constants, with a negative sign in front. Thus, the right hand side of the equation (82) is positive. On the left, since (1 +
2 is a square root, and therefore positive, this implies that (1 + ξZt) must be positive as well for the equality to hold. (1 + ξZt) > 0 implies that Zt < −1/ξ Substitute for Zt to get the result. This result puts a bound on how liquid the price can be. The liquidity is bounded by the product of price informativeness and un-learnable, future risk.
To get from this result to balanced growth requires the following steps: The result says that Ct/|Dt| < ρ ((r − G)/r) (C
The first term is just fixed parameters. The second term, (C
x ) is the variance of the part of tomorrow's price that depends on future shocks, xt+1 and yt+1. This is the future information risk. It converges to a large, positive number as K grows. When information is abundant, high future information risk pushes Ct/|Dt| down, toward a constant.
In contrast, if order flow analysis were to keep growing faster than fundamental analysis (Ω f t /Ωxt were to fall to zero), by the first order condition (15), it means that (Ct/Dt) 2 keeps rising to infinity. But if (Ct/Dt) 2 is converging to infinity, then at some point, it must violate the inequality above because the right side of the inequality is decreasing over time. Thus, order flow analysis cannot grow faster than fundamental analysis forever.
The only solution that reconciles the first order condition, with the equilibrium price coefficients, is one where (Ω f t /Ωxt) stabilizes and converges to a constant. If fundamental analysis grows proportionately with order flow analysis, the rise in the amount of fundamental analysis makes prices more informative about dividends: Ct increases. Proportional growth in fundamental and order flow analysis allows Ct to keep up with the rise in Dt, described above. Therefore, as information technology grows (K → ∞), a stable Ct/Dt rationalizes information choices (Ωxt, Ω f t ) that grow proportionately, so that Ωxt/Ω f t converges to a constant.
C Robustness of Numerical Results
We want to investigate the effect of changing parameters on the predictions of the numerical model. First, we show how re-calibrating the model with different risk aversion affects the values of other calibrated parameters. Then we show how changes in risk aversion and other parameters have modest effects on results. We consider changes to the exogenous, yet important parameters of time preference, risk aversion and terminal capacity, first. Then, we consider altering endogenous, calibrated parameters of dividend innovation variance, hedging innovation variance and relative cost of order-flow information.
Lower risk aversion The steady state coefficients with low risk aversion ρ = 0.05 are We find AT = 16.03, CT = 7.865 and DT = −3.0. AT and CT are unchanged, while DT changed from = −5.7, for high risk aversion to 3.0. Table 2 shows the original calibration and a lower-risk aversion calibration to highlight how the other parameters adjust when risk aversion changes. Changes to fixed parameters We consider lower/higher time preference, risk aversion and terminal capacity. Whenever a parameter is changed, all other parameters are re-calibrated to match that new value and the numerical model is simulated again. Figure 10 : Results with different rates of time preference. The first row is information acquisition, the second row is capacity allocation and the third row are the price coefficients. Column 1 is the baseline calibration used in the paper, corresponding to r = 1.03. Column 2 displays the path with r = 1.01 and column 3 with r = 1.05. Column 1 is the baseline calibration used in the paper, corresponding to ρ = 0.1. Column 2 displays the path with ρ = 0.05 and column 3 with ρ = 0.2. Changes to calibrated parameters We consider lower/higher dividend shock variance, hedging shock variance and relative cost of order-flow information. As these parameters are determined jointly by the calibration, we cannot simply change them and re-calibrate as above. Rather, we calibrate to the baseline then change the parameter of interest for the experiment and then recover the model's terminal values associated with that new parameter of interest. It is important to note that we do not re-calibrate the other parameters when we make changes here. The first row is capacity allocation and the second row is the price coefficients. Column 1 is the baseline calibration used in the paper. Column 2 displays the path for a lower τx and column 3 for a higher τx. Liquidity Fragility
The main text shows that liquidity becomes more sensitive to one-period changes in future expected dividend variance. A similar degree of liquidity fragility arises from changes in the cost χx of order flow data processing. Figure 16 shows the reaction of liquidity |Dt| to a one-time, unexpected doubling of χx. Notice that an equal sized movement in χx has a small effect when technology is low and a larger effect as financial technology progresses. Illquidity jD t j
D Data Appendix
Asset price and return data for calibration Calibrating the numerical model requires some price and dividend series that accurately represents the market as a whole. However, it is not clear what the best method for defining this representative asset it. One option is to pick some historically representative stock, such as General Electric, or Apple, but even though these stocks may be the best available representative, that does not mean that they capture the market as a whole. Another option is to take an index, such as the S&P500, as a representative of the market. While using an index may capture more about the market, its realizations in levels are not representative of actual prices or dividends, but rather just a tracking mechanism of the evolution of the market. Aware of the deficiencies in both approaches, we choose the added information of the S&P500 index and live with the difficulty of normalizing prices and dividends to better fit a representative asset. We use CRSP's monthly S&P500 data from 2000-2015 to calibrate the steady-state of our model. Cleaning and normalizing the data takes several steps:
1. Impute dividends In order to impute a dividend series for the market as a whole, we use the price, return including dividends and return excluding dividends series.
2. Clean up data We log de-trend and deseasonalize the price and dividend series and then normalize the dividend series to 1.
3. Normalize dataIn order to match the price series to dividends in a meaningful way, we take price-dividend (PD) ratios from CRSP for all S&P500 members and calculate an annual market cap.-weighted PD ratio. Then, prices are normalized year-by-year to match that observed PD ratio.
It turns out that this normalization process loses little of the dynamics of the index series, while also being far more accurate in terms of the describing the level relationship between prices and dividends for a representative asset of the market. Figure 18 (a) displays the normalized price series with the actual price-index series. Figure 18 (b) displays the normalized dividend series with the imputed dividend series described above. is based on hedge fund data from Lipper. Lipper TASS provides performance data on over 7,500 actively reporting hedge funds and funds of Hedge Funds and also provides historical performance data on over 11,000 graveyard funds that have liquidated or stopped reporting. In addition to performance data, data are also available on certain fund characteristics, such as investment approach, management fees, redemption periods, minimum investment amounts and geographical focus. This database is accessible from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Though the database provides a comprehensive window into the hedge fund industry, data reporting standards are low. There is a large portion of the industry (representing about 42% of assets) that simply do not report anything (Edelman, Fund, and Hsieh, 2013) . Reporting funds regularly report only performing assets (Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2014) . While any empirical analysis must be considered with caution, some interesting stylized facts about the current state and evolution of the hedge fund industry do exist in these data.
All hedge fund data is monthly and come from Lipper TASS. In total, the database reports on 17,534 live and defunct funds. Data are from 1994-2015, as no data was kept on defunct funds before 1994. A significant portion of this total consists of the same fund reported in different currency and thus are not representative of independent fund strategies (Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2014) . Therefore, we limit the sample to only U.S.-based hedge funds and remove funds of funds. This limits the sample size to 10,305 funds. As the focus is to gain insight into the division between fundamental and quantitative strategy in the market, We further limit the sample to the 7093 funds who explicitly possess these characteristics, described below. Firms are born and die regularly throughout the sample. There are never more than 3000 existing, qualifying funds at any point in time. By the end of 2015, there were just over 1000 qualifying funds.
Lipper TASS records data on each fund's investment strategies. In total, there are 18 different classifications and most of these classifications have qualities of both fundamental and quantitative analysis. An example of a strategy that could be considered both, "Macro: Active Trading strategies utilize active trading methods, typically with high frequency position turnover or leverage; these may employ components of both Discretionary and Systematic Macro strategies." However, 4 strategy classifications explicitly denote fund strategy as being fundamental or quantitative. They are:
• Fundamental: This denotes that the fund's strategy is explicitly based on fundamental analysis.
• Discretionary: This denotes that the fund's strategy is based upon the discretion of the fund's manager(s).
• Technical: This denotes that the fund deploys a technical strategy.
• Systematic Quant: This denotes that funds deploy technical/algorithmic strategy.
Using these classifications, it is possible to divide hedge fund strategy into three broad groups:
• Fundamental: Those funds whose strategy is classified as fundamental and/or discretionary, and not technical and/or sytematic quant.
• Quantitative: Those funds whose strategy is classified as technical and/or systematic quant, and not technical and/or sytematic quant.
• Mixture: Those funds whose strategy is classified as having at least one of fundamental or discretionary and at least one of technical or systematic quant.
From 2000-2015, the assets under management (AUM) has systematically shifted away from fundamental firms to firms that deploy some sort of quantitative analysis in their investment approach. In mid-2000, the assets under management per fundamental firm was roughly 8 times the size of that in a quantitative or mixture firm, but this had equalized by 2011, representing a true shift away from fundamental analysis and towards quantitative analysis in the hedge fund industry.
